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The history of insurance has been characterised, more than for most industries and 
services, by a wide range of organisational forms, including obligatory and voluntary 
public mutual institutions; private mutual associations; public and private stock 
corporations – some with monopoly powers; large unincorporated stock companies; 
small unincorporated private partnerships; and syndicates of individual underwriters 
managed in some places (such as Lloyd’s) by brokers.   2
The reasons for this plethora of vehicles remain unclear, as does its impact of 
on the global development of insurance. It is likely that there were many country 
specific factors at work that determined the balance of public and private forms of 
insurance in any one place over time. It may also be possible, however, to identify 
generic political, economic and cultural factors, common to several markets, which 
explain why public forms of insurance were more prominent in some economies than 
in others.  
This article examines the potency of path dependent effects in determining the 
historical distribution of public and private forms of insurance in a range of developed 
and developing economies. The path dependency literature has expanded enormously 
1            ​Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the X Congress of the Spanish 
Economic History Association (AEHE) conference in Carmona, and at the XVII 
World Economic History Congress in Kyoto. I thank the participants for their useful 
comments, and also the editor and three anonymous reviewers for ​Enterprise and 
Society​ whose advice and suggestions have greatly improved this article.  
2          For recent historical approaches to this topic, see Zanjani, “Regulation”; 
Pearson and Yoneyama,​ Corporate Forms​. The theoretical and economic literature is 
much larger. Examples include Hansmann, “Organisation”; Hansmann, ​Ownership​; 
Smith and Stutzer, “Theory of Mutual Formation”.  
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since its original focus on the persistence of inefficient technologies.  A variety of 3
models, emphasising institutional, locational and other ‘fundamentals’ as well as 
economic determinants of path dependence,  have been applied, for instance, to the 
evolution of business strategies, the size of cities, human capital accumulation in 
Brazil and water rights in the American West, to name some examples.  Curiously, 4
path dependency theory appears to have been seldom ​applied to financial service 
industries or​ used to explain the development of organizational forms.  To this extent, 5
this article makes a novel contribution to the literature on path dependency, although 
its main purpose is to understand the diversity of organizational forms that have 
characterised the business of insurance throughout its history. 
In their critique of technological path dependence, Liebowitz and Margolis 
usefully identified three types.  First-degree path dependence is a simple assertion of 6
inter-temporal effects, where technological choices are sensitive to initial conditions 
but there is no implied inefficiency of outcomes. In second-degree path dependence 
efficient decisions may not always turn out to be so in retrospect but the inefficiency 
is not known at the outset. Third-degree path dependence describes a dynamic market 
failure that is brought about by the persistence of certain inefficient choices, where the 
initial errors in those choices were avoidable. The argument presented below 
conforms most closely to the first-degree model, the weakest form of the three. Our 
3 The seminal article was by David, “Clio”. See also Arthur, ​Increasing 
Returns​.  
4 Sydow et al., “Organizational Path Dependence”; Bleakley and Lin, “History”; 
De Souza, “Immigration”;  Libecap, “Institutional Path Dependence”. 
5 In a JSTOR survey that I conducted of several hundred articles with path 
dependence in the title or as keywords, only one explicitly applied the concept to 
explain the persistence of organisational forms, viz. van Driel and Devos, “Path 
Dependence in Ports”. 
6 Liebowitz and Margolis, “Path Dependence”. 
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survey of a large number of national insurance markets from the eighteenth to the 
twentieth centuries points to the primary importance of the state and different political 
cultures in determining the persistence of certain organizational forms in national 
insurance markets and in ensuring the continuation of the organisational diversity 
noted above. Our argument, however, makes no claim that state actions locked in 
inefficient organisational forms and resulted in market failure, the strongest version of 
path dependence theory.  
Our focus, therefore, is on the state and the historical development of the 
insurance industry in a wide range of economies. The following section examines the 
history of the state as an exogenous force shaping insurance markets. The subsequent 
three sections examine the state as a participant in those markets in the early modern 
and modern eras, including its role in social insurance and nationalisation. The 
conclusion identifies the determinants of organizational forms in insurance, and also 
discusses the impact of different insurance vehicles on market development, thus 
touching on the efficiency question. The relative costs and benefits of public and 
private forms of insurance, however, amount to a huge topic for a future international 
comparative study, and much of the detailed research for many countries on questions 
such as market distortions and crowding out remains to be done. 
  
The state as gatekeeper, regulator and facilitator. 
In relation to insurance markets, the state has had four principle historic functions: 
those of ​gatekeeper​, ​regulator​, ​facilitator​ and ​participant​. Through the exercise of 
these functions, states have, at different times and in different places, constricted, 
created, grown and distorted markets both to the cost and benefit of consumers and 
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insurers. The sections below focus on the state’s role as a participant in insurance and 
the forms in which this occurred. This section outlines the early history of the other 
three functions. 
Since the fifteenth century European states have acted as gatekeepers to the 
insurance market, prohibiting or authorising certain types of insurance, certain types 
of organisation and other vehicles for insurance provision such as agents, and, in 
places, the volume of insurance supplied by private individuals and organisations. The 
clearest example of prohibitory gatekeeping was the ban on forms of life insurance 
that were regarded as wagers in both Catholic and Protestant states between the 
fifteenth and eighteenth centuries. Thus, Venice banned wagers on the pope’s life in 
1419, in Spain all forms of life insurance were suppressed by the Ordinances of 
Barcelona in 1435, and Genoa prohibited insurance on kings, princes, bishops, popes, 
cardinals and other objects of insurance gambling in 1467, 1475 and 1494.  Other 7
examples of state proscriptions included the parliamentary ban on marine reinsurance 
in England in 1746. This statute (19 Geo.II c.37) was enacted because of concerns 
about the lack of insurable interest in many insurance policies and the opportunity 
presented by reinsurance contracts for the fraudulent concealment of information by 
direct insurers.  Such prohibitions were imposed not just by monarchical regimes but 8
also by republican governments. The first life and fire insurance corporations in 
France, licensed by royal authority, were banned by the National Convention in 1793. 
In many US states in the nineteenth century buying reinsurance from companies not 
authorized to do business in the state was prohibited.   9
7 Roover,  “Marine Insurance”. 
8 The reinsurance ban was not repealed until 1864. Raynes, ​British Insurance​, 
167-8. 
9 See, for example, the list in Hayden's ​Cyclopedia​, 1906-7 (New York, 1907). 
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The European prohibitions on life insurance derived from religious-ethical 
anxieties about the use of insurance as wagers and the negative social and political 
effects on ​ancien regime​ populations. In early modern England, by contrast, the lives 
of ship passengers continued to be insured, albeit in small numbers, in marine 
insurance policies that came to be governed by common law. The latter, unlike the 
continental Law Merchant, did not draw on Roman legal precepts that regarded life 
insurance as unethical because it was a form of trading in lives.  By the eighteenth 10
century, as the importance of religious doctrines in political culture began to wane, 
and long before law courts drew a formal distinction between illegal wagers and legal 
life insurance based on an insurable interest, life insurance in England grew via small 
private mutual schemes such as ‘mortuary tontines’ - at least 60 were launched 
between 1696 and 1721 - as well as via larger and more permanent organisations such 
as the mutual Amicable Society of 1705, and the two London stock corporations of 
1720.  Thus differences in political cultures and legal traditions helped determine 11
variations between European states in the treatment of life insurance, and this in turn 
ensured a continuing diversity in the forms by which it was delivered.  
Other things being equal, governments have the power to limit moral hazard 
more thoroughly and cheaply than private insurers can through market operations. 
Rather than prohibiting insurance outright, some regimes employed their licensing 
procedures to control supply and demand in an attempt to eradicate over-insurance 
and what they perceived to be the attendant moral hazard and social evils. This 
10 Clark, ​Betting on Lives​, 19. By contrast, the Spanish and Antwerp marine 
insurance ordinances made no mention of insuring lives at sea. Kepler, “London 
Marine Insurance”, 51. On the relative ineffectiveness of the Law Merchant applied to 
marine insurance cases in England, see Jones, “Elizabethan Marine Insurance”. 
11 Clark, ​Betting on Lives​, 71-99. The distinction between wagers and life 
insurance was enshrined in the Gambling Act of 1774. 
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practice was especially prevalent in northern and central Europe during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, ​where political cultures were generally characterized by 
autocratic governments, powerful bureaucracies, and police forces committed to an 
array of monitorial and social-disciplinary actions.  This was manifested in​ ​the form 12
of ‘preventative controls’ on fire insurance contracts and restrictions on who was 
permitted to insure, as well as tightly controlling the issue of licenses to companies 
and their agents. The Duchy of Magdeburg, for example, required farm labourers and 
other workers to subject any property they wished to insure to an exact valuation, in 
order to prevent ‘dissolute and immoral people’ (​liderliche Leute​) from over-insuring. 
Regulations to reduce the moral hazard associated with over-insurance and excessive 
claims payments continued in Germany well into the nineteenth century, underpinned 
by the belief of state officials that not all citizens were ‘mature’ enough for private 
insurance. A Saxon government order of 1828 required policyholders to obtain the 
approval of the local police captain (​Amtshauptmann​), before they could co-insure 
their property in more than one company. In Württemberg a law of 1852 required 
policyholders to obtain a certificate of valuation from the local council 
(​Gemeinderat​).   13
Another device to regulate supply was the requirement in some states for 
companies to show that their business met a public ‘need’. In Prussia, for example, 
under a law of 1837, new companies wishing to obtain licenses from the Ministry of 
Interior, or licensed companies wishing to appoint additional agents in cities, had to 
provide proof that there was a ‘demand’ (​Bedürfnis​) for their services. This proof took 
12 The literature is large, but see, for example, Koselleck, ​Preussen​;  Lüdtke, 
Police and the State​.  
13 Gesellschaft, ​Deutsche Feuerversicherungswesen​, volume 2, 219. 
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the form of a testimony from the local town or county administration that the demand 
existed. It does not seem to have been based on any empirical evidence or scientific 
investigation of data. Indeed, critics pointed out that many existing insurance 
companies in small towns appointed the local mayors and councillors as their agents, 
who therefore had a vested interest in preventing the admission of new competitors.  14
The requirement was abolished in Prussia in 1859, but survived longer in other states 
such as Austria and Baden.  
Increasingly during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries many 
governments, usually for ideological reasons or acting under external political 
pressure, extended their gatekeeping functions to impose discriminatory fiscal and 
regulatory burdens on foreign insurers in an effort to deter entry and encourage exit. 
Examples include the higher tax rates charged on foreign companies compared to 
their domestic competitors in Sweden in 1857, Belgium in 1907, and several 
American states such as Pennsylvania (1856), Massachusetts (1862), Missouri (1866) 
and Kansas (1899).  Deposit, policy, and reporting requirements could also be made 15
taxing to foreign companies applying to enter a market. Legislation in Bulgaria in 
1898, for example, required all foreign insurers to make deposits in government 
securities.  Some American states required foreign companies to deposit cash in each 16
location in the state where they had agents. Thus, in Ohio in 1858 the deposits 
required ranged from $50,000 in Cincinnati to $10,000 or $20,000 in other cities.   17
14 Rundschau der Versicherungen​ 13 (1863): 368-72. 
15 For Sweden, see Lönnborg, ​Internationalisierung​, 72. For Belgium, see 
Assecuranz Jahrbuch​ 14 (1893) 431; ibid. 29 (1908) 283.  For the US, see ​First 
Annual Report of Insurance Commissioner of Pennsylvania​ (1873); ​Western 
Insurance Review​ III (1869-70), 382; ​ibid​. I (1867-8), 310-11. 
16 Assecuranz Jahrbuch​ 20 (1899): 436-7. 
17 United States Insurance Gazette​ 8 (1858-9): 379. 
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In the past states have also frequently restricted or directed the supply of 
insurance by issuing monopoly privileges to for-profit private groups, usually in 
return for some revenue benefit. With some of these ventures the lines between state 
monopoly and private monopoly authorised by the state were particularly blurred, 
especially where compulsion was involved. This was a favourite device of ​ancien 
regime​ governments in Europe. One example is the monopoly on corporate marine 
insurance issued to two groups of investors in London in 1720, who formed the Royal 
Exchange Assurance and London Assurance companies in return for ‘loans’ of 
£300,000 each to the Crown. The effect was to drive business towards underwriters at 
Lloyd’s, who were not subject to the restriction on corporate underwriting. The 
monopoly was finally repealed in 1824, but by then over 95 per cent of marine 
insurance in Britain was underwritten at Lloyd’s.  This is a good example of how 18
state-authorised private monopolies could distort a market and skew it in one direction 
at the expense of alternative forms of supplier. Other examples occurred in Russia. 
Having rejected the idea of a public insurance institution, in 1827 the Tsarist state 
issued an exclusive monopoly charter for the First Russian Fire Insurance Company 
of St Petersburg to insure property in the residence towns, Odessa and the Baltic 
provinces. In 1835 a similar charter was issued to the Second Russian Company for 
other ​gouvernements​. These monopoly privileges were repealed in 1847, but 
important restrictions continued. Thereafter, Russians could only insure with foreign 
companies if they had already been refused insurance by the Russian companies.  19
The state could also facilitate the growth of insurance by reducing risk and by 
collecting and publishing information on hazards and others events. With its national 
18 Supple, ​Royal Exchange​, 188; Raynes, ​British Insurance​, 190. 
19 Rundschau der Versicherungen​ 10 (1860): 263-4, 299. 
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resources, it could do this on a scale and frequency that private companies could not, 
until the latter began to collaborate more effectively towards the end of the nineteenth 
century when faced with a new range of technologies.  Early examples of state 20
intervention in this area include data on deaths in English towns collected by local 
churchwardens in parish registers. In the early nineteenth century, most English life 
insurance companies based their premium rates on the mortality tables constructed 
from the registers of Northampton and Carlisle by Richard Price in 1781 and Joshua 
Milne in 1815 respectively. The actuarially unfair prices produced by these tables – 
which suggested a much higher level of mortality than contemporary life insurers 
were experiencing among their policyholders – probably acted as a stimulus to 
investment in new life insurance companies. There were only six such companies in 
England in 1800 but over 150 by 1850. Legislation to combat overcrowding and poor 
sanitation in urban areas, together with improvements to public health services, by 
reducing the frequency and virulence of epidemics and lowering average mortality, 
were other ways in which the state contributed to the growth of cheaper life insurance.
 Some £290m was insured on lives in Britain in 1870, up from £12m in 1800.  21 22
20 The most striking manifestations of this collaboration were the risk inspection 
bureaus established by various fire underwriters’ associations  in US cities and 
regions in the 1880s, which gave rise to the famous Underwriters’ Laboratories (UL) 
in 1894. By 1922 UL were distributing 500m safety approval labels on industrial and 
consumer products per year. Tebeau, ​Eating Smoke​, 283-4. I am grateful to an 
anonymous reviewer for pointing to this development.  
21 In Victorian Britain the public health movement began with the report of the 
parliamentary committee on the health of towns (1840) and Edwin Chadwick’s 
Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain 
(1843). These were soon followed by legislation such as the Nuisances Removal Act 
(1846), the Metropolitan Commission of Sewers Act (1848) and the Public Health Act 
(1848). 
22 Trebilcock, ​Phoenix Assurance, ​volume 1, 578-9, 603-9; Supple, ​Royal 
Exchange​, 111-12, 131-2. 
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Public authorities at local and national level, with their powers of enforcement 
and tax-raising capacity, were usually better equipped than private insurers to prevent 
or mitigate the number and intensity of physical hazards such as fire, flood, 
windstorm and earthquake, as well as to counter the dangers of new technologies. 
From the late middle ages, the building codes of numerous English towns attempted 
to reduce the fire hazards caused by shoddy construction and inflammable materials.  23
In many places fire-fighting was organised, albeit often inefficiently, by local 
authorities, and parish fire brigades supplemented the private brigades of the fire 
insurance companies.  
States could also help private insurers cope with the risks involved in insuring 
against the hazards brought by new technologies. The regulation of road traffic is one 
area in which the state played a major role in facilitating the growth of an insurance 
market in many countries.  Another example is engineering and machinery insurance. 24
The boiler explosions acts passed by the British parliament in 1882 and 1890 greatly 
added to the functions already carried out by the specialist boiler insurance companies 
that had emerged since the 1850s. The legislation made provision for the investigation 
of all commercial boiler explosions by engineers appointed by the Board of Trade. 
Further provision for the regular inspection of boilers was made by the Factory and 
Workshop acts of 1901, 1911 and 1920, and this principle of official safety inspection 
was extended in the early twentieth century to all classes of powered machinery, 
helping engineering insurance to develop as a specialist class of underwriting.   25
23 Pearson, ​Insuring the Industrial ​Revolution, 60-1, 83-4. 
24 Westall, “Invisible Hand”; Mohun, ​Risk​, 175-9, 186-8. 
25 Raynes, ​British Insurance​, 291-2. 
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In sum, these three exogenous roles of the state, as gatekeeper, regulator and 
facilitator, in shaping the business and legal environment for different organizational 
forms in insurance, arguably created path dependent effects, in the sense that state 
actions, and national political cultures more generally, helped particular business 
forms persist over time in different economies, and ensured the continuing diversity, 
rather than the organizational convergence, of the industry.  
 
The state as participant: public insurance and state ownership in the early 
modern period 
Public authorities have also participated, directly or indirectly, in insurance markets. 
When entering these markets as actors and not simply regulators, states have certain 
advantages over private insurers. As Robert Wright has noted, governments have 
powers that private insurers do not, including the ability to limit adverse selection by 
compelling individuals and businesses to enrol in a public insurance program and 
forcing them to pay premiums and taxes.  Governments have longer time horizons 26
that enable them to withstand economic downturns more efficiently than private 
companies, and they often have deeper pockets to provide emergency relief, victim 
compensation and recovery support in the wake of large disaster events. There are 
disadvantages too, which have been widely commented upon. Public insurance can be 
inefficient, it can distort markets and it can generate serious asymmetric information 
and adverse selection problems. These issues are examined below. First, however, this 
section outlines the different forms that have been taken by state actors in insurance 
markets. 
26 Wright, “Insuring America”. 
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In early modern Europe, while private underwriters and brokers continued to 
operate in many ports, some states moved to found monopoly institutions for marine 
insurance, such as those in Genoa and Copenhagen in 1742 and 1746 respectively.  27
In 1751 the Kingdom of Naples created the ​Real Compagnia di Assicurazioni 
Maritime​. All merchant ships operating out of Naples were required to insure in the 
company, though many Neapolitans still preferred to insure in London where 
premiums were lower. Once the ​Real Compagnia​ was abolished in 1802, the 
Neapolitan market was returned to private operators, but instead of being confined to 
individual underwriters as before, a number of new marine insurance companies 
began to appear, beginning with the ​Societa Napoletana di Assicurazioni Maritime​ in 
1811. By the late 1850s several dozen companies - ranging from small partnerships to 
large joint stocks – had been founded in Naples, Messina and Sorrento, suggesting 
that a pent-up supply of marine insurance capacity had been suppressed by the 
monopoly of the royal company.  ​ Clearly the development of marine insurance in 28
Genoa, Naples and Copenhagen was skewed by these monopoly institutions, although 
given the current limited state of research, it is difficult to know whether in their 
absence private corporate forms would have emerged earlier than they did. In the case 
of Trieste, where there was no state monopoly, several private stock companies 
formed for marine insurance during the late eighteenth century, but most failed during 
the Napoleonic wars when Trieste lost business to more price competitive centres in 
Hamburg, Amsterdam and London.   29
27 Rohrbach, “Von den Anfängen,” 179. 
28 Sirago and Avallone, “Risk of the Sea”. 
29 In part this was due to the lack of convoy facilities available to Austrian ships 
trading out of the port. Rohrbach, “Von den Anfängen,” 184-5. 
13 
 
On the whole, the evidence from early modern Europe suggests that direct 
participation by the state in marine insurance had limited success. One probable 
reason was that marine risks were non-standardised, and therefore relatively costly to 
handle for large corporations with high overheads. It was difficult to construct 
standard tariff schedules on an actuarial basis to price such risks. Second, the 
international regulation of marine underwriting at an early date reduced transaction 
costs for the individual underwriter and increased the confidence of shippers seeking 
insurance.  ​Third, as Kingston has argued, well organised systems of individual 30
underwriting such as Lloyd’s of London could deliver information advantages over 
their corporate rivals.  Where markets of individual underwriters were less 31
developed, where there were doubts about the security of the contracts issued, and 
where the political, legal and economic environment was conducive to the formation 
of joint stock enterprises, as in the United States around 1800, private corporations 
could prevail, but there were no obvious competitive advantages for state corporations 
in marine insurance, at least in peacetime.   Some states, however, retained a direct 32
involvement in marine insurance for political reasons. During the 1870s in China, for 
instance, several public-private insurance ventures appeared, beginning with the 
China Merchants Steam Navigation Company​, with the Manchu government as a 
shareholder. It was the first example of the Chinese state moving into the insurance 
30 Ordinances issued at Barcelona between 1435 and 1484 placed maritime 
insurance under the ​Consulat de Mar​, which formed the basis for international 
commercial law in the Mediterranean. Further ordinances were passed in Italy, Spain, 
Flanders, and England during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and 
chambers of insurance were set up in several ports to prevent fraud, reduce the costs 
of disputes, and establish the principle of full disclosure between insurers and the 
insured. See Leonard, ​Marine Insurance​.  
31 Kingston, “Marine Insurance in Britain and America”. 
32 Kingston, “Marine Insurance in Philadelphia”.  
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business as part of a wider nationalist strategy to bolster the economy, and particularly 
Chinese shipping, against foreign competition. The ​China Merchants Steam 
Navigation Company​ and its related companies proved successful and opened 
overseas branches in Singapore, Philippines and San Francisco. They closed after the 
crash of 1929.  33
In early modern Europe there is much greater evidence of state participation 
and success in fire insurance than marine insurance. This was part of a growing 
mercantilist interest in utilising government powers to improve the security of private 
property and incomes, ​not least in response to the huge revenue needs of the 
fiscal-military state.  Public fire insurance ​derived from​ the medieval tradition of 34
briefs and compulsory collections for victims of fires. Such collections, for example, 
took place at county and parish levels in Denmark, Germany, England and Sweden. 
From the late seventeenth century, this traditional system of public ​post hoc​ relief for 
losses by fire, was supplemented by various municipal and state institutions for the 
insurance of buildings, in some places accompanied by compulsion. The first 
successful public fire insurance institution was the ​Hamburger Feuerkasse​ of 1676 
which originated in local ‘fire contracts’, written agreements between groups of about 
100 owners of property within the town walls by which, in return for a fixed 
subscription, victims of fire would receive compensation towards repairing or 
rebuilding their property.  The contracts were private arrangements, but from 1620 35
they were required to be confirmed by the town senate, thus lending them a degree of 
official recognition. By the 1670s there were some 46 ‘fire contracts’ in Hamburg. 
33 Kang, “Assurances Moderne”. 
34 Brewer, Sinews of Power; Schulze, “The Tax State,”  
35 The following is based on Büchner, “Hamburger Feuerkasse”. See also 
Zwierlein, ​Der gezähmte Prometheus​, 223-42. 
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Their small scale and the difficulty of spreading risk in a confined area led the senate 
to combine all the contracts into one new insurance fund, the ​Feuerkasse​, to be 
administered by council officials. There was no compulsion on existing householders 
to join the fund - compulsion was first introduced in 1817 - but whoever built a new 
house or bought or inherited a house was required to join. Losses were adjusted by 
deputies of the ​Feuerkasse​, assisted by selected craftsmen. In the event that the fund 
proved insufficient to cover payments, members were liable for further calls at fixed 
rates proportionate to the sums they had insured. The fund was also used to pay the 
medical bills of citizens injured fighting fires or a lifetime annuity to those rendered 
permanently disabled, as well as the burial costs of the victims of fires. The institution 
thus combined elements of a mutual association with those of a state-administered 
public welfare body.  
The Hamburg ​Feuerkasse ​provided a model for ​mercantilist regimes 
elsewhere to copy. Public buildings insurance societies were formed across much of 
Germany during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  They were also 36
formed in Denmark in 1731, in Switzerland, where cantonal insurance began in 1782, 
and in Sweden, where the government organised a General Fire Insurance Fund in 
1782. Most public societies were local or regional in scope, and, as extensions of state 
bureaucracy and revenue systems, managed by civil servants, they​ were characteristic 
of the political cultures into which they were born​. The ‘Fire Society for the Towns in 
the Duchy of Cleve and the County of Mark’, for example, was managed by an 
official commission appointed by the province, while the Westphalian state tax 
36 Borscheid, ​Feuersozietäten​, 42-4. Zwierlein has counted 96 founded in 
German-speaking territories between 1676 and 1817. Zwierlein, ​Der gezähmte 
Prometheus​, appendix II, 370-2. 
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commissioner, appointed by the King, decided upon the contribution quota for each 
town. Here and in the other public insurance societies in Prussia soldiers were on 
guard as claimants appeared personally before the town magistrates to receive their 
payouts. There was no corporate identity and often no specific building – they were 
administered from a desk in a government building as one of several public funds, 
including funds for schools, churches and the poor. Insurance was generally issued on 
a non-actuarial basis.  Policyholders were usually charged flat fees for all types of 
property, and the fees were paid like any other tax (a crude risk classification was first 
introduced by the Hamburger ​Feuerkasse​ in 1753, and only later by other societies). 
Public insurance societies were non-profit organisations. Their primary purpose was 
to pay for the rebuilding of property damaged by fire, while any surplus left was 
normally used to supplement other forms of welfare expenditure. There was often a 
compulsory rebuilding clause inserted into members’ contracts, and payments were 
usually made on the basis of historic rather than rebuilding cost.  Yet for all their 37
limitations from a modern perspective, the public societies appear to have been 
remarkably successful, insuring between 50 and 75 per cent of property in some parts 
of northern Europe.   38
With urban growth the public societies increasingly faced a problem of 
changing cost structures. Where they insisted on a level of self-insurance, property 
owners turned to private companies to fill the gap. From 1840 under​ ​the growing 
influence of liberal ideologies,​ authorities began to permit private insurers to compete 
freely with state institutions in three Prussian provinces, Rhineland, Westphalia and 
37 Büchner, “Hamburger Feuerkasse”, 26. 
38 Zwierlein, ​Der gezähmte Prometheus​, 297-8. 
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Poznan.  Traditional suspicions of private insurance lingered, but states increasingly 39
placed limits on the extent of their participation in fire insurance. A common 
weakness was the inability of public societies to accumulate sufficient funds to cope 
with major fire disasters in urban areas. This was true, for example, of the Swedish 
General Fire Insurance Fund of 1782, which, after several large town fires, ran out of 
money to meet claims. Its managers were also reluctant to insure poorer risks - 
housing not built with fire resistant materials - which led to conflict between different 
interest groups in the Fund. By 1828 the Fund had split into three separate 
organisations, one insuring only rural property, one insuring urban property, and a 
third formed by policyholders themselves exclusively for the southernmost province 
of Sweden.   40
Private companies insuring contents against fire were tolerated by ​ancien 
regimes​, not only because of the complexities of underwriting non-standard risks that 
were increasingly subject to technological change, but also because the policyholders 
were mostly wealthier merchants and property owners who were regarded as literate 
and numerate enough to understand what they were buying. As private insurance 
companies began to carve out a market for the insurance of moveable goods, 
nineteenth-century​ states responded by removing the monopoly of public societies for 
buildings insurance, thus forcing them to compete with private stock and mutual 
companies in a more open market. At the same time, efforts were made, for instance 
in Prussia during the 1820s and 1830s, to combine the smaller societies into larger 
regional bodies in order to improve their competitiveness.  In several countries this 41
39 Borscheid, “Insurance Industry in Germany,” 49. 
40 Larsson and Lönnborg, “Insurance Companies in Sweden,” 199. 
41 Borscheid, ​Feuersozietäten​. 
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seems to have worked, for public fire insurance societies managed to sustain their 
share of the market. In Denmark in 1827, for example, state insurance on buildings 
amounted to £18.1m, compared to £19.1m insured by the largest private society, the 
Brandforsikkring for Huse og Gaarde​.  In Germany public societies accounted for 36 42
per cent of all sums insured against fire in 1879, and still 34 per cent in 1910.  43
Around two thirds of this derived from compulsory buildings insurance, the rest from 
voluntary buildings and contents policies.  There is little question that public 44
insurance crowded out the supply of private fire insurance in such markets over a long 
period. It also contributed to the fragmentation of markets, and perhaps increased 
consumer choice and kept prices down by reducing the power of the tariff 
associations of private companies, although this requires confirmation by further 
research. In sum, different kinds of direct participation by early modern states in 
national insurance markets, and the political cultures that facilitated such 
participations, shaped the organizational structure of these markets in ways that 
proved remarkably persistent through time. 
 
The state as participant: social insurance in the modern era 
Three basic types of social insurance existed from the late nineteenth century: 
voluntary and compulsory employment-based social insurance, largely delivered by 
private for-profit providers with some state oversight; and compulsory not-for-profit 
universal integrated social security and health insurance systems provided and 
managed by the state. In their different ways and at different times these delivered 
42 Brown, “Fire Insurance”.  
43 Calculated, respectively, from ​Assecuranz Jahrbuch​ 10 (1889): 278; ibid. 33 
(1912): 208. 
44 The ratio relates to 1877 and is calculated from data in ​Rundschau der 
Versicherungen​ 29 (1879): 255-6. 
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insurance against sickness, workplace accidents, unemployment and old age for ever 
larger numbers of people. The voluntary accident insurance schemes provided by 
private companies were stimulated by the first generation of employers’ liability 
legislation in Europe. The Imperial German liability law of 1871, for example, made 
employers in sectors such as mining and railroads liable to their employees in the 
event of workplace injuries, though insurance was not obligatory. Any compensation 
paid by an employer’s insurance company was set against the compensation granted 
by a court, on the assumption that the insurance would cover only part of the 
employer’s legal liability. This greatly increased the demand in Germany for private 
accident insurance. The belief was that injured workers or their relatives would give 
up costly litigation against employers once compensated by such insurance payments.
 Similarly in the UK the Employers’ Liability Act of 1880 made employers liable for 45
injuries caused to certain classes of employees by negligence in the workplace. The 
effect of this legislation was to give private providers a much wider field for personal 
accident insurance. The Workmen’s Compensation Acts of 1897 and 1906 extended 
the principle of compensation to new groups of British workers, to accidents not 
necessarily caused by negligence, and to ill health caused by industrial diseases. This 
was an example of state intervention intentionally creating a huge new market for 
private insurance companies without encroaching directly on the operation of the 
business. 
Compulsory-contribution employment-based social insurance first appeared in 
Germany with Bismarck’s national health insurance legislation in 1883, statutory 
accident insurance in 1884 and state disability and old age insurance for workers in 
45 Arps, ​Auf Sicheren Pfeilern​, 65-6; Stadlin, “Actuarial Practice,” 44; Guinnane 
and Streb, “Incentives”.  
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1889. ​In the volatile political culture of the Second Reich, Bismarck expressly viewed 
these new social insurance schemes as devices to wean discontented industrial 
workers away from Social Democracy and Marxism.  Rising medical costs, together 46
with the limited provision of medical and hospital services, increased incentives to 
insure against loss of income from sickness, but private health insurance remained 
beyond the pockets of most German workers. This weak market for private health 
insurance helps explain the limited resistance to the new legislation. The health 
insurance scheme of 1883, for example, comprised a system of sickness funds based 
either geographically or in particular firms or guilds. Employers were required to 
provide insurance for all employees earning less than 2000 marks p.a., although those 
who earned more were allowed to buy into the scheme. Premiums were paid 
two-thirds by the worker and one-third by the employer. The insured were entitled to 
free medical and other auxiliary treatment. Benefits also included cash payments up to 
half of the worker’s wage for a given period of sickness or incapacity, after which 
trade associations covered the cost of any treatment. Doctors were contracted and paid 
directly by the funds for their services.  The initial legislation applied only to certain 47
categories of industrial worker, covering about ten per cent of the population, but by 
1927 coverage had been extended to transport, clerical, farm and forestry workers, 
domestic servants, government employees, seamen and the unemployed. These 
statutory schemes helped spread the understanding of insurance through German 
46 Cf. Bismarck, ​Dokumente​, no. 317 Im Gespräch mit Moritz Busch, 21 Januar 
1881; Bebel, ​Aus meinem Leben​, 754-6; Engelberg, ​Bismarck​, 379-416. 




society. Life insurance premiums in Germany, for instance, increased from 86m 
Marks in the 1880s to 278m Marks in the 1900s.   48
The development of a compulsory contribution system in Germany provided a 
model for many other countries. In Sweden mandatory industrial injury insurance, 
delivered by private companies, was legislated for in 1901 and 1916. In Austria 
accident insurance was made mandatory for large industrial firms in 1887.  In the US 49
between 1900 and 1920 three systems co-existed. Monopoly state funds to provide 
workmen’s compensation were set up in some states (Ohio and Washington in 1911, 
Nevada, Oregon and West Virginia 1913, Wyoming 1915, North Dakota 1919) where 
insurance and farming interests were weak and unions strong, or where progressives 
swept into power. Legislation to establish state funds against which private insurers 
were allowed to compete was passed in a further ten states beginning in Michigan in 
1912. Elsewhere experiments in state insurance were rejected. In many American 
states the debate was whether workmen’s compensation insurance should be 
purchased from a state fund or whether employers should be free to buy from private 
companies. Unions lobbied hard for state insurance on the grounds that private 
companies should not profit from the misfortunes of injured workers, and that public 
insurance could eliminate the overheads and profits of selling private insurance, so 
that employers’ premiums could be reduced and workers’ benefits increased. The 
private companies claimed that the state had no actuarial experience and that only 
they had the expertise to adjust rates for the different accident rates experienced 
across industries. In sum, both the varying alignment of narrow interest groups and 
broader political interests in different states determined the fate of public monopoly 
48 Borscheid, “Vertrauensgewinn,” 317.  
49 Murray and Nilsson, “Accident Risk Compensation”. 
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legislation and the shape of accident insurance systems in the US during the early 
twentieth century.   50
By contrast, in Britain the legislation of 1897 and 1906 failed to establish any 
public competitor to the private provision of workmen’s compensation insurance. Not 
until a government committee of 1920 was the question of a state fund, operating 
either as a monopoly or in conjunction with private companies, or a state system of 
mutual insurance, considered. By this time there were already 65 insurance companies 
underwriting workmen’s compensation business. In addition, about 10,000 employers 
were organised in mutual associations in the seven industrial groups to which the 
1906 act applied, covering perhaps one third of all firms. The business had been 
profitable but expensive for employers. The committee of 1920 concluded that the 
existing system could be allowed to continue, but under stricter state supervision, led 
by a commissioner with powers to grant licences to companies and mutual 
associations to write workmen’s compensation insurance. An act to this effect was 
passed in 1923. Not until 1945, however, was a comprehensive state system of 
contributory social insurance adopted, a system that finally superseded the private 
provision of workmen’s compensation insurance.  51
The statutory health insurance programmes that appeared in Europe before 
1914 differed greatly between countries in terms of their coverage, organisation, 
finance and method of delivering medical care. Health insurance was introduced by 
statute in Italy, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, and France between 1886 and 
1898, and then in the UK, Norway and Switzerland between 1909 and 1911. Denmark 
and Sweden began with voluntary schemes after studying the German model. In 1894 
50 Fishback and Kantor, “Durable Experiment”.  
51 Raynes, ​British Insurance​, 301-15. 
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and 1898 Belgium granted legal advantages to private sickness funds that registered 
with the government and subsidies to those that submitted to state regulation, but not 
until 1914 was health insurance made compulsory. In France from 1898 friendly 
societies that provided sickness benefits received government subsidies. Such 
schemes appear to have accelerated the reduction in European mortality before 1914.
  52
In the US state and federal governments fostered the employment-based 
system of private provision that has remained dominant to the present day. Demand 
for health insurance increased from the 1930s with advances in medical technology 
and rising health care costs. At same time, hospitals pushed to have pre-paid plans 
developed for their services, which became combined under the names Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield. These plans gained non-profit tax-exempt status, which initially gave 
them an advantage over commercial competitors. Several states also exempted them 
from existing insurance regulations and reserve requirements, while insisting that the 
same premiums be charged for sick members as healthy members. During the 1940s 
commercial insurers gained ground on the Blues by basing their rates on experience 
and offering lower premiums to younger workers. In 1942 the War Labor Board 
allowed firms to attract workers using fringe benefit packages, which also boosted 
employment-based insurance. Tax subsidies and tax exemptions of employers’ health 
insurance premiums, introduced in 1943 and 1954 respectively, provided further state 
support to employer-provided health insurance, lowered its relative price, stimulated 
the growth of group schemes, and encouraged people to buy more comprehensive 
52 Winegarden and Murray, “Early Health Insurance”. 
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cover. Thomasson has shown that from the 1950s Americans with health insurance 
spent significantly more on medical care than those who remained uninsured.   53
In the UK the German model of compulsory contributions ran against the 
grain of Victorian ​liberalism and​ social policy. Arguments against compulsory 
schemes centered on the alleged need to incentivise the ‘respectable poor’, and on the 
opposition of trade unions and friendly societies defending their own benefit funds. 
The German model did, however, have a major impact on the reforms of 1908 to 
1911, when the Liberal government finally introduced compulsory contribution 
insurance for sickness, invalidity, old age and unemployment.  In 1925 a contributory 54
non-means tested social insurance was introduced in Britain, but membership was 
compulsory only for employees earning below £250 p.a.. Not until the National 
Insurance Act of 1946 was compulsory, unified and universal social insurance 
introduced in the UK, funded on a pay-as-you-go basis, i.e. by a tax on current 
expenditure. In 1948 the state pension was underpinned by National Assistance, 
which retained a means test for supplementary benefits to help the poorest pensioners. 
The increasingly inadequate basic pension, which lagged in value behind average 
earnings, resulted in 27 per cent of pensioners claiming the supplementary benefit by 
1954.   55
Sweden introduced mandatory state pensions in 1913, to be delivered, like 
Sweden’s mandatory industrial injury insurance, by private companies. In the 1950s 
53 Thomasson, “From Sickness to Health”. 
54 The 1908 act established a non-contributory means-tested pension from the 
age of 70 funded out of general taxation. It proved inadequate. The German model 
was ruled out, as it had been before. Macnicol, ​Politics of Retirement​, 156-62. The 
German system of compulsory contributions was finally adopted in the National 
Insurance Act of 1911. Hennock, ​British Social Reform​; Pearson, “Who Pays for 
Pensions?” 
55 Hannah, ​Inventing Retirement​. 
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the Swedish Social Democrats argued for a supplementary pension reform built upon 
the mandatory scheme, with the state guaranteeing the benefits against inflation, while 
other parties supported a voluntary system with or without state guarantees. The result 
of the debate was the supplementary pension reform of 1959, introduced after the 
appointment of a Social Democrat minority government.   56
In the US mandatory pension insurance was finally enacted in 1935, after long 
resistance by private insurers. The US was the last industrial country in the world to 
enact a national (federal) scheme to help the elderly. By 1920 mandatory old age 
insurance had already been established in ten European countries. By contrast, of 21 
reports commissioned by US state legislatures by 1929, only one recommended 
compulsory insurance. It took the exigencies of the Great Depression to compel 
American legislators to take action.  In Latin America social insurance programs 57
evolved in a piecemeal and stratified fashion, segmented by occupation, with interest 
groups extracting different levels of concessions from the state. The armed forces, 
civil servants, professionals and white-collar employees obtained the most generous 
health care benefits and pensions, while rural workers and workers in non-strategic 
industries invariably obtained the worst due to their weaker bargaining power. While 
the latter had the lowest costs and contribution rates, they also experienced lower than 
average life expectancy and the poorest insurance coverage.  What the above survey 58
clearly shows is that different political and legal regimes, as well as macro-economic 
conditions such as average purchasing power and levels of development, were the 
56 Larsson and Lönnborg, “Insurance Companies in Sweden,” 220-1. 
57 Weaver, “Political Market”. 
58 Mesa-Lago, “Social Security in Latin America”.  
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primary determinants of the type of social insurance systems - public, private, or some 
blend of the two - that appeared from the late nineteenth century. 
 
The state as participant: nationalisation 
It remains to ask why some modern states nationalised, or partly nationalised, their 
insurance industries? History suggests three, often interconnected, reasons. First, 
fiscal-monetary motives sometimes played a part: faced with economic difficulties, 
some governments sought to gain control of the revenue streams generated by 
financial services. Second, policies of autarky or economic nationalism, often bound 
up with right- or left-wing political ideologies, viewed nationalisation as a means to 
stop the outflow of funds to foreign companies. Third, certain regimes, sometimes 
socialist or social democratic, sometimes based on religious beliefs, viewed private 
insurance with hostility on moral or ideological grounds. They regarded 
nationalisation as a device to counter practices harmful to public welfare, notably the 
high costs, poor governance and rent seeking that they associated with private 
insurance organisations. 
The latter argument appeared in the debates on insurance nationalisation that 
took place in Imperial Germany. Bismarck repeatedly accused private insurers of 
distributing excessive dividends to shareholders to the detriment of their 
policyholders. On religious-ethical grounds he claimed that profits should not be 
made out of the misfortune of individuals. On economic grounds he argued that a 
state institution could deliver insurance more cheaply than private companies, and 
called for a comprehensive scheme providing all types of insurance on a mutual basis. 
He received support from conservative agrarian groups, who thought this might help 
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bind German workers to the existing social order, and from the influential economist 
Adolph Wagner, who saw in state insurance an opportunity to engage in social 
engineering by redistributing premiums from the wealthy to the poor, making those 
who represented the lowest risks pay the highest premiums. Opposition came from the 
private companies, from the insurance press, liberal politicians and the Congress of 
German Economists. In the end, Bismarck’s full nationalisation was not carried 
through. Instead, as noted above, the growth of the private insurance sector in 
Germany was actually stimulated by the social insurance legislation of the 1880s and 
1890s.  59
Other countries that opted to nationalise their insurance industries, or parts 
thereof, included New Zealand, who established a state life insurance office in 1870. 
By 1904, this office accounted for nearly half the life insurance sold in New Zealand. 
Insurance in it was compulsory for civil servants, whose premiums were paid by a 
deduction from salaries at source. The venture was run on a non-profit basis, but the 
government did receive an annual revenue from the life office, which was treated for 
tax purposes like a private corporation. Further state offices for accident and fire 
insurance were set up in competition with private companies in 1899 and 1903 
respectively.  60
In Italy before the First World War there was a fierce debate over 
nationalising life insurance.  Conservative politicians and economists argued against 61
a state monopoly because it ran counter to the principle of free competition, and 
because they did not trust the state to run an insurance institution efficiently. Those 
59 Arps, ​Auf Sicheren Pfeilern​, 81-98, 111. 
60 Reeves, “State Insurance in New Zealand.” 
61 The following is based on Fanfani, “Insurance in Italy,” 114-20.  
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arguing for a state monopoly emphasised the growing proportion of Italian life 
insurance that was in the hands of foreign companies - about 41 per cent by 1912 - 
and claimed that a state institution would help protect the savings and pensions of the 
wealthy and policyholders and investors from bankruptcies and from private company 
tariff rates. Despite the opposition, the ​Istituto Nazionale dell Assicurazioni​ (INA) 
was established in 1912. The law establishing INA allowed private companies to 
continue operating for up to 10 years, but required them to hand over to INA 40 per 
cent of every insurance they wrote. Few were prepared to do this and many 
companies left the market. The perceived problem of revenue flows to foreign 
insurers was greatly reduced after 1919 when national borders changed and the large 
Trieste companies, such as Generali and RAS, that had previously belonged to the 
Austrian empire, became Italian.  INA’s monopoly was abolished by Mussolini in 62
1923, but it continued operating and played an important role after 1945 in the finance 
of housing construction.  
Between the 1920s and the 1950s, full nationalisation, or alternatively some 
form of compulsion to insure or reinsure in a state-run institution, became popular 
with many regimes that aspired to economic autarky such as those in Chile, Uruguay, 
Turkey and Spain. In Argentina, the establishment of a public-private joint 
reinsurance venture, the Instituto Mixto Argentino de Reaseguros (IMAR) was part of 
a package of financial reforms introduced by the government of Juan Perón in 1946 
that were designed to give the state greater control over the economy and to aid 
economic planning. Foreign insurers were required to reinsure with the IMAR 30 per 
cent of any business they wrote in Argentina. The IMAR was also tasked with 
62 I am grateful to Giandomenico Piluso for making this point to me. 
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examining all applications for licenses and testing these against market ‘need’, along 
the lines of the old police licensing systems in Europe. In 1952 the IMAR was 
replaced by the fully nationalised Instituto Nacional de Reaseguros (INDER), 
managed out of the Ministry of Finance. The effect of this two-stage process of 
nationalisation was dramatic. In 1946 44 per cent of reinsurance on Argentine risks 
was retroceded abroad. By 1958 that figure had fallen to below one per cent.   63
Most of the above cases involved countries where native insurers were 
increasingly resorting to foreign companies for their reinsurance needs after foreign 
direct insurers had been squeezed out of the market by competition and discriminatory 
regulation and taxation. States such as Argentina then became concerned about the 
growing dependency of their countries on foreign supplies of reinsurance, though 
many recognised that there were limits to the domestic supply of reinsurance, which 
by its nature required an international distribution of risks. The nationalisation of life 
insurance in India also followed after the market share of foreign companies had been 
declining for some time. After independence, the new Indian government sought to 
reshape the economy in a socialist direction and in 1951 it introduced its first 
five-year plan. At the end of this plan life insurance was nationalised and a new 
state-owned Life Insurance Company of India (LIC) was set up. The finance minister, 
C.D. Deshmukh, explained that nationalisation would spread the life insurance habit 
into the rural population and provide policyholders with benefits that they could not 
expect from a privately-owned enterprise. The real objective, however, was to 
mobilise life insurance funds for social investment. Jitschin’s analysis shows that 
loans and mortgages together accounted for 54 per cent of the LIC’s investments by 
63 Zappino, ​El Instituto Mixto​. 
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1968.  Before nationalisation, mortgages had never amounted to more than five per 64
cent of the assets of private life insurance companies. The LIC even introduced an 
‘Own your own home’ house-building scheme in 1964. Jitschin concludes that the 
LIC acted as a proxy for the Indian state in its investment strategy, supporting 
national political objectives.  
Elsewhere, debates over nationalisation led to different outcomes. In Sweden 
in 1936 a nationalisation bill was only narrowly rejected by parliament. A year later 
the private insurance companies formed the Swedish Insurance Federation to lobby 
against the ongoing threat. In 1946, after ten years of discussion, a parliamentary 
commission finally recommended new laws that supported a private system with 
closer state regulation. The ‘Swedish model’ of insurance that emerged ended the 
long debate over nationalisation. The new laws greatly expanded the powers of the 
Swedish Insurance Inspectorate from the traditional monitoring of company solvency, 
which had been its primary function since 1886, to assessing market demand when 
issuing licenses, monitoring the costs and premium rates of life insurance companies, 
requiring the separation of life insurance from other branches of insurance, requiring 
the representation of policyholders on the boards of both mutual and stock companies, 
and enforcing a ‘mutuality’ principle, namely that all life insurance companies must 
return profits to their policyholders, regardless of ownership structure. The private 
companies were not enthusiastic about the new regime, but they recognised that it was 
better for them than outright nationalisation. One effect of the legislation was to raise 
barriers to entry, which encouraged the larger companies to develop new low-cost 
products, to increase efficiency, and to expand via consolidation and mergers.   65
64 Jitschin, “From Economic to Political Reality”. 





Conclusions: the determinants and consequences of organisational form 
Throughout modern history the primary function of the state has been to protect its 
citizens and their property from hazards and threats, external and internal. It is clear 
that there has seldom been any time or place where the state has not been involved in 
the amelioration of risk, and therefore in some way or other, directly or indirectly, in 
the business of insurance. Public authorities have been gatekeepers, regulators and 
facilitators for private insurance markets, regulating the supply of insurance, 
monitoring sources of moral hazard, protecting domestic insurance companies by 
restricting the operations of foreign competitors and trying to ensure that companies 
met their obligations to policyholders and creditors. In its non-insurance regulatory 
role, the state has had the capacity to facilitate the growth of insurance by reducing 
risk and by diffusing data and technical knowledge about hazards. It has also been 
able to stimulate new markets, for example in personal and professional liability 
insurance, by regulating in the areas of consumer protection, environmental protection 
and health and safety.  
Many states have also participated, directly or indirectly, in insurance markets, 
exploiting their power to compel citizens to pay premiums and taxes. What mainly 
determined the emergence of public insurance provision in the past? The changing 
nature of risk - a technology explanation - seems to have played, at most, a minor 
role. The problem of assessing and pricing new risks has largely been handled by the 
private sector - the explosion of new insurance products launched by Lloyd’s 
underwriters from the 1880s is one obvious example.  During industrialisation in 66
66 Pearson, “Lloyd’s of London”. 
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nineteenth-century Europe, public fire insurance associations usually left more 
complex risks related to industrial property and contents to private companies. 
Another possible explanation - that public insurance emerged because of the 
inefficiency or failure of private markets - was often put forward by its advocates as a 
justification for state intervention, either indirectly through regulation or directly 
through the establishment of a state insurance institution. Yet there is only limited 
historical evidence that public insurance was any more efficient than private 
provision. There are examples to consider. Due to the efficiency of its loss adjustment 
procedures and its relatively low rate of contributions, the Salzburg buildings 
insurance association, established under Bavarian occupation in 1811, proved popular 
with local policyholders, and it survived the return of the Tirol region to Hapsburg 
rule in 1816, despite the fact that the government in Vienna was already encouraging 
the formation of private companies for fire insurance.  Here and in other places in 67
Europe, some public institutions were able to compete with private companies even 
without powers of compulsion or monopoly. This does not prove, however, that they 
were intrinsically more efficient. When gaps in the market were left by public 
providers, or when licensing restrictions or monopoly privileges were removed - as in 
marine insurance in Naples after 1811 or fire insurance in Prussia from the 1860s - 
private insurers were usually quick to move in. Further research is required on the 
relative cost advantages and productivity of public and private forms of insurance 
before we can be sure how to evaluate the market efficiency explanation. 
What comes across clearly from our investigation is the importance of 
political factors. The wave of public institutions for fire and marine insurance founded 
67 Rohrbach, “Von den Anfängen,” 215-16, 221-3. 
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across Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries reflected a growing interest 
on the part of governments to utilise their powers to improve the security of private 
property and incomes. This in turn was the product of changing economic, political 
and legal relations within states as the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie grew in 
wealth and influence. In the twentieth century some states began to nationalise or 
partly nationalise their insurance industries both for fiscal-monetary motives and also 
because of the logic of the politics of autarky and the desire to exercise control over 
major economic sectors such as financial services. Underlying the policies of various 
states was also often an ideological hostility to private enterprise, or at least a concern 
that for-profit insurance might be detrimental to public welfare. Moreover, as we have 
seen above, the varying alignments of narrow interest groups and broader political 
interests in different states could determine the fate of public insurance legislation 
and, for example, the shape of accident insurance in the US during the early twentieth 
century, or the social insurance systems developed in Sweden and the UK after 1945. 
In sum, it is probable that political cultures, and their associated bureaucratic and 
legal frameworks, created important path dependent effects, which determined and 
locked in, though not irreversibly, the organizational structure of markets and the 
distribution of insurance provision between the public and private sectors, and 
between different forms of private insurance - cooperatives, mutual associations, 
stock corporations, unincorporated stock companies, and syndicates of individual 
underwriters.  
As noted in the introduction, the stronger version of path dependent theory 
posits that a sensitivity of choices to initial conditions leads to outcomes, most 
notably technologies, which are not only inefficient but which could have been 
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avoided because more efficient alternatives were available. The argument made above 
for the importance of political cultures and state action in shaping persistent structures 
in national insurance markets makes no claims for the efficiency or inefficiency of the 
organizational forms thus locked in. Nevertheless, although it is not the principal 
object of this article, our historical survey does shed some light on the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of public insurance that are worth discussing.  
There is no question that forms of state intervention have in many instances 
provided an enormous boost to the diffusion of insurance throughout the population. 
Mandatory state social insurance has delivered better cover against sickness, 
workplace injuries, unemployment and old age for growing numbers of people since 
the late nineteenth century. Many of these schemes, where they were not part of a 
universal integrated social security provision by the state, greatly expanded the market 
for private insurance companies. The result in many countries has been huge 
improvements in public welfare. State sickness insurance helped reduce mortality in 
Europe before 1914. Mandatory state schemes resulted in pensions for more workers 
in the UK from 1911, Sweden from 1913 and the US from 1935. The nationalisation 
of life insurance in India led to increased investment in public housing from the 
1950s. Government treasuries were replenished by revenue from state insurance and 
reinsurance institutions in South America and New Zealand. Municipal fire fighting in 
eighteenth and nineteenth-century Europe was supported by revenue garnered from 
public buildings insurance associations. 
The disadvantages of public insurance have been widely commented on. First, 
it has been argued that state-run insurance is inefficient. There is evidence to support 
this from across the period. Some public buildings associations, for example, 
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struggled to accumulate sufficient funds to enable them to cope with the claims 
arising from large fires in their localities. This was the case in Sweden in the 1820s 
and in Hamburg after the great fire of 1842. The key problem was the high 
concentration of insured properties within an urban area, sometimes exacerbated by 
compulsory insurance, together with the lack of reinsurance facilities at the time. 
Direct participation in marine insurance by some European states during the 
eighteenth century had limited success. The heterogeneity of shipping risks was 
relatively costly for public (or indeed private) corporations to handle and it was 
difficult to find an actuarial basis upon which to price such risks. The low costs and 
information advantages developed by underwriters at Lloyd’s of London and other 
centres of marine insurance usually gave them a competitive advantage over state 
corporations. 
Second, it has been claimed that state insurance can distort the market, destroy 
privately provided alternatives, and redistribute funds from the broad base of 
taxpayers to special interest groups.  Certainly public buildings insurance crowded 68
out private fire insurance in markets such as Scandinavia and Germany over a long 
period of time. It also contributed to the fragmentation of these markets, though 
arguably it also increased consumer choice and kept prices down by reducing the 
power of the cartels formed by private companies. Third, it is said that state insurance 
can generate serious asymmetric information and adverse selection problems. History 
suggests there is validity in this argument. In early nineteenth-century Sweden, for 
example, the state fire insurance fund tended to select the safest risks, leaving the 
poorest timber-built property uninsured or for private underwriters to cover. Research 
68 Wright, “Insuring America,” 259-60. 
36 
 
shows that US farmers with access to state-subsidized insurance, price supports and 
disaster relief take on more financial and production risks than unsubsidized farmers 
do. The government flood insurance program in Louisiana induced construction in the 
southern part of the state, which weakened natural defences against flooding and 
increased the damage caused by hurricanes. Federal disaster relief and compensation 
has encouraged continued risk-taking and underinsurance by property owners in 
catastrophe-prone regions such as California and Florida.  Similar arguments have 69
been put forward for social security and national health insurance, that it discourages 
savings and private insurance provision, and perpetuates poverty and intergenerational 
wealth disparities by reducing the bequests of the less affluent to their children. A 
study of the expansion of the Medicaid programme in the US between 1987 and 1992, 
for example, concluded that this had reduced the take-up of employer-based private 
insurance and resulted in diminished coverage for workers’ dependents.   70
State insurance can leave a lasting footprint that is difficult to erase, even 
when governments resolve to liberalise and deregulate insurance markets. This is 
clearly shown in Kwon’s study of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar and Nepal.  Between 1950 and 1975 they all nationalised insurance or 71
established state-owned corporations and restricted the licensing of private companies 
shortly after independence. Since the early 1990s all have gradually privatised their 
insurance industries. Yet the legacy of nationalisation has proved tenacious. These 
markets continued until very recently to be dominated by state-owned institutions. 
Most continued to enforce compulsory cession requirements as a means of retaining 
69 Wright, “Insuring America,” 260; Froot, ​Financing of Catastrophe Risk​.  
70 Cutler and Gruber, “Public Insurance.”  
71 Kwon, “History of Insurance”. 
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reinsurance premiums in the country, which has increased the concentration of risk. 
Most failed to provide policyholder protection funds, continued to maintain premium 
rate tariffs, continued to lack effective solvency regulations, and continued to prohibit 
cross-border insurance transactions. In short, for insurance throughout history there 
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